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Nancy Cartwright has been both an empiricist and a realist. Where many philosophers
thought that these two positions are incompatible (or, at any rate, very strange bed-
fellows), right from her first book, the much-discussed and controversial How the
Laws of Physics Lie, Cartwright tried to make a case for the following view: if
empiricism allows a certain type of method in its methodological arsenal (inference to
the most likely cause), then an empiricist cannot but be a scientific realist—in the
metaphysically interesting sense of being ontically committed to the existence of
unobservable entities. Many empiricists thought that since empiricism has been
traditionally anti-metaphysics, it has to be anti-realist. One of the major contributions
that Cartwright made to the philosophy of science is, I think, precisely this: there is a
sense in which metaphysics can be respectable to empiricists. Hence, scientific realism
cannot be dismissed on the grounds that it ventures into metaphysics. To be sure, the
metaphysics that Cartwright is fond of is not of the standard a priori (or armchair)
sort. It is tied to scientific practice and aims to recover basic elements of this practice
(e.g., causal inference). But it is metaphysics, nonetheless.
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2Cartwright’s realism has been described as “entity realism”. This is not accidental.
She repeatedly made claims such as “I believe in theoretical entities” (1983, 89—see
also 92). Typically, she contrasted her commitment to entities to her denial of
“theoretical laws”. In sections 2 and 3 of this paper, I shall examine in some detail the
grounds on which Cartwright tried to draw a line between being committed to entities
and being committed to theoretical laws, and I shall find them wanting. Section 3 will
also claim that the method Cartwright articulated, Inference to the Most Likely Cause,
is important but incomplete. Specifically, I shall claim that there is a more exciting
method that Cartwright herself describes as Inference to the Best Cause, which,
however, is an instance, or a species of Inference to the Best Explanation. But
Cartwright has been against Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). So, section 4 will
consider and try to challenge Cartwright’s central argument against IBE.
At least part of the motivation for her early, restricted, realism was a certain
understanding of what scientific realism is. She took scientific realism to entail the
view that the world has a certain hierarchical structure, where the more fundamental
laws explain the less fundamental ones as well as the particular matters of fact. In her
The Dappled World, she rightly disentangled these issues. “Nowadays”, she says, “I
think I was deluded by the enemy: it is not realism but fundamentalism that we need
to combat” (1999, 23). What, I think, emerges quite clearly from her later writings is
that Cartwright does not object to realism. Rather, she objects to Humeanism about
laws, causation and explanation. Insofar as Humeanism is a metaphysics independent
of scientific realism, Cartwright is a more full-blown realist, without being Humean.
And this is what she is. In section 5, I shall discuss in some detail Cartwright’s central
non-Humean concept, viz., capacities. Cartwright is a strong realist about capacities.
They are the fundamental building blocks of her metaphysics. But there seem to be a
number of problems with capacities. Though we can easily see how attractive it is to
be a realist about capacities, I think it’s really hard to be one. So, though Humeanism
is certainly independent of scientific realism, I shall argue that we have not been given
compelling reasons for a non-Humean metaphysics of capacities.
It will be helpful to state clearly five worries about Cartwright’s view that I will
develop in this paper. The first is that while she was right to insist on the ontic
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3commitment that flows from causal explanation, she was wrong to tie these
commitments solely to the entities that do the causal explaining. This move obscured
the nature of causal explanation and its connection to laws. The second worry is that
when she turned her attention to causal inference, by insisting on the motto of ‘the
most likely cause’, she underplayed her powerful argument for realism. For she
focused her attention on an extrinsic feature of causal inference (or, indeed, of any
ampliative inference), that is the demand of high probability, leaving behind the
intrinsic qualities that causal explanation should have in order to provide the required
understanding. The third worry is that her objections to Inference to the Best
Explanation were unnecessarily tied to her objections about the falsity of fundamental
laws. The fourth worry is that though her argument for positing capacities and being
realist about them was supposed to take strength from its parallel with Sellars’s
powerful argument for the indispensable explanatory role of positing unobservable
entities, there are important disanalogies between the two arguments which cast doubt
on the indispensability of capacities. The final (fifth) worry is that laws—perhaps
brute regularities—might well have to come back from the front door, since they are
still the most plausible candidates for explaining why objects have the capacities to do
what they can do.
2. Causal Explanation
One of Cartwright’s (1983) central claims is that causal explanation is ontically
committing to the entities that do the explaining. Here are some typical statements of
it:
That kind of explanation succeeds only if the process described actually occurs. To
the extent that we find the causal explanation acceptable, we must believe in the
causes described (1983, 5).
In causal explanations truth is essential to explanatory success (1983, 10).
But causal explanations have truth built into them (1983, 91)
(…) existence is an internal characteristic of causal explanation (1983, 93).
4These assertions are not all equivalent with one another, but I will not dwell on it. For,
there is indeed something special with causal explanation. So, let’s try to find out
what it is. As a start, note that it is one thing to say that causal explanation is
ontically committing, but it is quite another thing to say what a causal explanation is.
Let’s take them in turn.
2.1 Ontic Commitment. If c caused e, then, clearly there must be events c and e which
are thus causally connected. This follows almost directly from the standard
Davidsonian account of singular causal statements. Causation is not quite the same as
causal explanation, but causes do explain their effects and there is, to say the least, no
harm in saying that if c causes e then c causally explains e. This feature of causal
explanation by virtue of which it is ontically committing to whatever does the causing
is not peculiar to it. Compare the relation c preceded e: c  must exist in order to
precede e. So, Cartwright’s claim is an instance of the point that the relata of an actual
relation R must exist in order for them to be related to each other by R. I think this is
what Cartwright should mean when she says that “(…) existence is an internal
characteristic of causal explanation” (1983, 93).
An equivalent way to show that causal explanation is ontically committing is this.
To say that the statement ‘c causally explains e’ is ontically committing to c and e is
to say that ‘c causally explains e’ is true. This way of putting things might raise the
spectre of van Fraassen, as Hitchcock (1992) reminds us. Couldn’t one just accept
that ‘c causally explains e’ without believing that it is true? And if so, couldn’t one
simply avoid the relevant ontic commitments to whatever entities are necessary to
make this sentence true? Indeed, insofar we can make sense of an attitude towards a
statement with a truth-condition which involves acceptance but not belief, van
Fraassen is on safe ground here. He is not forced to believe in the truth of statements
of the form ‘c causally explains e’. Cartwright’s point, however, is not meant to be
epistemic. Her point is, I think, two-fold. On the one hand, she stresses that we
cannot avoid commitment to the things that are required to make our assertions true.
On the other hand (and more importantly), insofar as we do make some assertions of
the form ‘c causally explains e’ (e.g., about observable events such as short-circuits
and fires, or aspirins and headaches), there is no reason not to make others (e.g., about
unobservable entities and their properties).
5So, causal explanation is egalitarian: it sees through the observable-unobservable
distinction. It is equally ontically committing to both types of entity, precisely
because the relation of causal explanation is insensitive to the observability of its
relata. In other words, what matters for ontic commitment is the causal bonding of the
relata of a causal explanation. So, Cartwright’s point is that there is just one kind of
way to be committed to entities (either observable or unobservable) and it is effected
through causal explanation.
2.2 What Exactly is a Causal Explanation? This remains an unsettled question, even
after it is accepted that causal explanation is ontically committing. The question, in a
different form, is this: what exactly is the relation between c  and e  if c  causally
explains e? In the literature, there have been a number of attempts to explain this
relation. I am not going to discuss them here.1 Cartwright has offered a gloss of the
relation c causally explains e. In her (1983, 25-6), she put forward an early version of
the contextual unanimity principle, viz., the idea that c causes e iff c increases the
probability of e in all situations (contexts) which are causally homogeneous with
respect to the effect e. I will not dwell on this principle here. But one thing is relevant.
Although principles such as the above do cast some light on the notion of causal
explanation, they do not offer an analysis of it, since they presuppose some notion of
causal law, or some notion of causally homogeneous situation. Cartwright is very clear
on this when she says, for instance, that what makes the decay of uranium “count as a
good explanation for the clicks in the Geiger counter” is not the probabilistic relations
that obtain between the two events, “but rather the causal law—‘Uranium causes
radioactivity’” (1983, 27). Still, it might be said that though Cartwright does not offer
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6“a model of causal explanation” (1983, 29) she does constrain this notion by objecting
to certain features that causal explanation is taken to have. Most centrally, she objects
to the deductive-nomological model of causal explanation. But it is not clear, for
instance, that she takes a singularist account of causal explanation. In fact, it seems
that she doesn’t. For she allows that certain “detailed causal principles and concrete
phenomenological laws” are involved in causal explanation (1983, 8). Her objection is
about laws captured by “the abstract equations of a fundamental theory” (ibid.). So,
even if she objects to the thesis that all causal explanation should be nomological, she
doesn’t seem to object to the weaker thesis that at least some causal explanation
should be nomological. In any case, it’s one thing to deny that the laws involved in
causal explanation are the abstract high-level laws of a theory and it is quite another to
deny that laws, albeit low-level ones, are involved in, or ground, causal explanation.
For all I know, Cartwright (1983) does not deny the latter.
Here is the rub, then. If laws are presupposed for causal explanation, then it’s no
longer obvious that in offering causal explanations we are committed just to the relata
of the causal explanation. To say the least, we should also be committed to a
Davidson-style compromise that there are laws that govern the causal linkage between
cause and effect. Though these laws might not be stateable or known, they cannot be
eliminated. But this is not the end of it. Considering Davidson’s idea, Hempel noted
that when the existence of the law is asserted but the law is not explicitly stated, the
causal explanation is comparable to having “a note saying that there is a treasure
hidden somewhere” (1965, 349). Such a note would be worthless, unless “the location
of the treasure is more narrowly circumscribed”. Think of it as an advice: where there
is causal explanation, search for the law that makes it possible. It’s a side-issue
whether this law will be a fundamental one or a phenomenological one or what have
you. This is a worry about the kinds of law there are and not about the role of laws in
causal explanation.
So, here is my first conclusion. Cartwright’s advertised entity-realism underplays
her important argument for ontic commitment. In offering causal explanations we are
committed to much more than entities. We are also committed to laws, unless of
course there is a cogent and general story to be told about causal explanation that does
not involve laws. Note that it is not a reply to my charge that there might be singular
causal explanation. This is accepted by almost everybody—given the right gloss on
7what it consists in. Nor would it be a reply to my charge that, occasionally, we do not
rely on laws to offer a causal explanation. A suitable reply would have to show that
causal explanation is totally disconnected, from laws. This kind of reply might be seen
as being offered by Cartwright when she introduces capacities. But, as we shall see in
section 5, it is at least questionable whether we can make sense of capacities without
reference to laws.
3. Causal Inference
Given the centrality of causal explanation in Cartwright’s argument for realism, one
would have expected her to stay firmly in the business of explaining its nature. But
Cartwright does something prima facie puzzling. She spends most of her (1983) in an
attempt to cast light on the nature of the inference that takes place when a causal
explanation is offered and on the conditions under which this inference is legitimate.
(Doesn’t that remind you of what Hume did?) One way to read what Cartwright does
is this: she is concerned with showing when a potential causal explanation can be
accepted as the actual one. More specifically, she is concerned with showing that
there is something special in causal explanatory inference which makes it sound (or, at
any rate, which makes it easier to check whether it is sound or not). She says:
Causal reasoning provides good grounds for our beliefs in theoretical entities. Given
our general knowledge about what kinds of conditions and happenings are possible in
the circumstances, we reason backwards from the detailed structure of the effects to
exactly what characteristics the causes must have to bring them about (1983, 6).
Thus put, causal reasoning is just a species of ampliative reasoning. From an epistemic
point of view, that the explanation offered in this reasoning is causal (that is, that it
talks about the putative causes of the effects) is of no special importance. What
matters is what reason we have to accept the conclusion about the putative cause.
This seems to me a crucial observation. Cartwright explicitly draws a contrast
between “theoretical explanation” and “causal explanation” (1983, 12). But this is, at
least partly, unfortunate. For it obscures the basic issue at stake. Qua inferential
procedures, causal explanation and theoretical explanation are on a par. They are
8species of ampliative reasoning and the very same justificatory problems apply to
both of them (perhaps to a different degree).
Cartwright does think that there is something special in the claim that the inference
she has in mind is a causal explanation. She calls this inferential process “inference to
the most likely cause” (1983, 6)—henceforth, IMLC. But there is a sense in which the
weight is on the ‘most likely’ and not on the ‘cause’. It’s just that Cartwright thinks
that it’s most likely to get things right if you are looking for causes than if you are
looking for something else (e.g., general theoretical explanations). Before we see
whether this is really so (see section 3.2), let us press the present point a bit more.
3.1 Inference to the Most Likely Cause. What kind of inference is IMLC? An obvious
thought is that we infer the conclusion (viz., that the cause is c) if and only if the
probability of this conclusion is high. But this is a general constraint on any kind of
ampliative inference with rules of detachment, and hence there is nothing special in
IMLC in this respect. A further thought then might be that in the case of IMLC there
is a rather safe way to get the required high probability. The safety comes from
relevant background knowledge of all sorts: that the effect has a cause, because, in
general effects do have causes; that we are offered a rather detailed story as to what
the causal mechanism is and how it operates to bring about the effect; that we have
controlled for all(?) other potential causes etc (cf. 1983, 6). All this is very instructive.
However, thus described, IMLC gets its authority not as a special mode of inference
where the weight is carried by the claim that c causally explains e, but from whatever
considerations help increase our confidence that the chosen hypothesis (viz., that it
was c that caused e) is likely to be true. If these considerations are found wanting (if,
for instance, our relevant background knowledge is not secure enough, or if we do not
eliminate all potential alternative causes, or if the situation is very complex) then the
claim that c causally explains e is inferentially insecure. It simply cannot be drawn,
because it is not licensed as likely.
Indeed, my present complaint can be strengthened. Consider what Cartwright says:
“(…) causal accounts have an independent test of their truth: we can perform
controlled experiments to find out if our causal stories are right or wrong” (1983, 82).
If we take this seriously, then all the excitement of IMLC is either lost or becomes
parasitic on the excitement of a controlled experiment. It is lost if for every instance of
9an IMLC it is required that a controlled experiment is performed to check the
conclusion of the inference independently. So, what if the excitement of IMLC
becomes parasitic on the excitement of a controlled experiment? Controlled
experiments are indeed exciting. But their excitement comes mostly from the fact that
they are designed to draw safe causal conclusions, irrespective of whether there is on
offer a causal explanation of the effect. When it is established by a clinical trial that
drug D causes relief from symptom S, we may still be in the dark as to how and why
this is effected, what the mechanisms are, what the detailed causal story is etc. I
thought that causal explanation—qua inference—is exciting not just because we can
get conclusions that are likely to be correct, but also because we get an understanding
of how and why the effect is produced. But so far, we have got only (or mostly) the
former. The hard question, I think, remains unaddressed: what is this (if anything) in
virtue of which a causal explanation—qua an explanatory story—licenses the
conclusion that it is likely to be correct? Put in more general terms, the hard problem
is to find an intrinsic feature of causal explanation in virtue of which it has a claim to
correctness and not just an extrinsic feature, viz., that there are independent reasons to
think it is likely.
3.2 Inference to the Best Cause. Cartwright seems aware of the need for such an
intrinsic feature. Occasionally, she describes IMLC as “inference to the best cause”
(1983, 85). I think this is not just a slip. Reference to ‘best cause’ is not just meant to
contrast IBC to Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), by replacing ‘explanation’
with ‘cause’. It is also meant, rightly I think, to connect IBC to IBE. It is meant to
base the inference (the detachment of the conclusion) on certain features of the
connection between the premises and the conclusion, viz., that there is a genuinely
explanatory relation between the explanation offered and the explanandum. The ‘best
cause’ is not just a likely cause; it is a putative cause that causally explains the effect
in the sense that it offers genuine understanding of how and why the effect was
brought about. Cartwright says of Perrin’s ‘best cause’: “we are entitled to [infer the
existence of atoms] because we assume that causes make effects occur in just the way
they do, via specific, concrete causal process” (1983, 85). If all we were interested in
was high probability, then we wouldn’t go for specific, concrete causal processes—for
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the more detail we put in, the more unlikely they become. The specific, concrete
causal processes matter for understanding, not for probability.
The upshot is that if we conceive causal inference as Inference to the Best Cause
(IBC), then it is no longer obvious that it is radically different from what has come to
be known as Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). The leading idea behind
IBE—no matter how it is formulated in detail—is that explanatory considerations are
a guide to inference. The inference we are concerned with is ampliative—and hence
deductively invalid. But this is no real charge. Inferential legitimacy is not solely the
privilege of deductive inference. IBC can then be seen as a species of IBE. It’s a
species of a genus, whose differentia is that in IBC the explanations are causal (see my
(2002b) for details.
What sort of inference is IBE? There are two broad answers to this. (1) We infer to
the probable truth of the likeliest potential explanation insofar as and because it is the
likeliest explanation. On this answer, what matters is how likely the explanatory
hypothesis is. (2) The best explanation, qua explanation, is likely to be true (or, at
least more likely to be true than worse explanations). That is, the fact that a
hypothesis H is the best explanation of the evidence issues a warrant that H is likely.
In his (1991, 61-5), Lipton has noted that the first answer views IBE as an inference
to the Likeliest Potential Explanation, while the second views it as an inference to the
Loveliest Potential Explanation. The loveliest potential explanation is “the one which
would, if correct, be the most explanatory or provide the most understanding” (op.cit.,
p.61).
Exactly the same distinction applies to causal inference. If we think of it as an
Inference to the Most Likely Cause (IMLC), then, as we have seen, the inferential
weight is carried by the likeliness of the proposed causal explanation. So, it’s not that
a causal explanation is offered that licenses the inference. Rather, it is that this
proposed explanation has been rendered likely. This rendering is extrinsic to the
explanatory quality of the proposed explanation and relates to what we have done to
exclude other potential explanations as likely. On the other hand, if we think of causal
inference as Inference to the Best Cause, then we are committed to the view that the
inferential weight is carried by the explanatory quality of the causal explanation
offered, on its own and in relation to competing alternatives. Roughly put, the weight
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is carried by the understanding offered by the causal story and by the explanatory
qualities that this story possesses.
Indeed, Cartwright speaks freely of “causal accounts” or “causal stories” offered
by causal explanations. The issue then is not just to accept that there must be entities
which make these causal accounts true. It is also to assess these accounts qua
explanatory stories. If we take IBC seriously, then there must be ways to assess these
accounts, and these ways must be guides to whether we should accept them as true. It
seems then that we need to take account of explanatory virtues a) if we want to make
IBC have a claim to truth; and b) if we want to tie this claim to truth not just to
extrinsic features of causal explanation (e.g., that it is more likely than other potential
explanations) but to intrinsic features of the specific causal explanatory story.
So, let me draw the conclusion of this section. Thinking of causal explanation as an
inference to the best cause will require assessing the causal story offered and this is
bound to be based on explanatory considerations which align IBC to IBE.2
4. Why Deny Inference to the Best Explanation?
It is well known, however, that Cartwright (1983) resists IBE. And it is equally well
known that she thinks she is not committed to IBE, when she vouches for IBC. So the
issue is by no means over. Cartwright explicitly denies that “explanation is a guide to
truth” (1983, 4). She discusses this issue quite extensively in her (1983). Due to lack
of space, I will focus on one of her arguments, which seems to me to be the most
central one. This is the argument from the falsity of laws. But before I go into this,
allow me to note an interesting tension in her current views on the matter.
4.1 The Transcendental Argument. Cartwright has always tried to resist global
applications of IBE. In particular, in her (1983), she tried to resist versions of the ‘no
miracles argument’ for realism.3 Consider her claim:
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I think we should instead focus on the causal roles which the theory gives to these
strange objects: exactly how are they supposed to bring about the effects which are
attributed to them, and exactly how good is our evidence that they do so? The general
success of the theory at producing accurate predictions, or at unifying what before had
been disparate, is of no help here (1983, 8).
The last sentence of this quotation is, to say the least, overstated. But let’s not
worry about this now. For, in her current views, the general anti-theory tone of her
(1983) has been superseded by a more considered judgement about theories and truth.
She concedes that “the impressive empirical successes of our best physics theories
may argue for the truth of these theories”, but, as we have already seen, she denies
that it argues “for their universality” (1999, 4). In fact, her talk about “different kinds
of knowledge in a variety of different domains across a range of highly differentiated
situations” implies that truth is in the vicinity. For knowledge without truth is an
oxymoron. So, her objections to Inference to the Best Explanation do not try to
challenge the very possibility of a link between explanation and truth. Rather, they
aim to block gross and global applications of IBE.
Let us look at Cartwright’s (1999, 23) argument for “local realism”, which, as she
says, is supposed to be a Kantian transcendental argument. The way she sets it up is
this: We have X—“the possibility of planning, prediction, manipulation, control and
policy setting”. But without F—“the objectivity of local knowledge”—X would be
impossible, or inconceivable. Hence F. It’s fully understandable why Cartwright
attempts to offer a transcendental argument. These arguments are dressed up as
deductive. Hence, they are taken not to have a problematic logical form. They
compare favourably with IBE. But apart from general worries about the nature and
power of transcendental arguments4, there is a more specific worry: is the above
argument really deductive?
A cursory look at it suggests that it is: ‘F is necessary for X; X; Therefore, F’.
But it is misleading to cast it as above, simply because it is misleading to say that
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rational to believe that there is local knowledge, or at the much more ambitious conclusion that there
is local knowledge?
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Cartwright's F  is necessary for X. Kant thought that Euclidean geometry was
necessary for experience. Of course, it isn’t. He could instead have argued that some
form of spatial framework is necessary for experience. This might well be true. But
now it no longer deductively follows that Euclidean geometry must be true. In a
similar fashion, all that Cartwright’s argument could show is that something—call it
F—is necessary for “the possibility of planning, prediction, manipulation, control
and policy setting”. But now, it no longer follows deductively that this F must be the
realist’s “objective local knowledge”, no matter how locally or thinly we interpret
this. To say the least, this F could be just empirically adequate beliefs, or unrefuted
beliefs, or beliefs that the world co-operates only when we actually try to set plans,
make observations, manipulate causes etc. Put in a different way, all that follows from
Cartwright’s transcendental argument is a disjunction: either objective local knowledge,
or empirically adequate beliefs, or … is necessary for the possibility of planning,
prediction, manipulation, control and policy setting. But which disjunct is the true
one? Further argument is surely necessary. There cannot be a transcendental deduction
of objective local knowledge.
My suggestion is this: the move from the “the possibility of planning, prediction,
manipulation, control and policy setting” to a realist understanding of what needs to
be the case for all of them to be possible (or, why not, actual) can only be based on an
inference to the best explanation: “The objectivity of local knowledge” (as opposed to
any other candidate) should be accepted on the grounds that it best explains “the
possibility of planning, prediction, manipulation, control and policy setting”. The
moral then is that Cartwright’s recent, more robust, realism can only be based on the
very method that she has taken pains to disarm. We can now move on to look at the
credentials of one her stronger early arguments against IBE, viz., the alleged falsity of
laws.
4.2 False laws? One of Cartwright’s main theses in her (1983) is that explanation and
truth pull apart. When laws come into the picture, this thesis seems to be the outcome
of a certain failure of laws. She puts it like this:
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For the fundamental laws of physics do not describe true facts about reality. Rendered
as descriptions of facts, they are false; amended to be true, they lose their
fundamental, explanatory power (1983, 54).
So, we are invited to see that if laws explain, they are not true and if they are true,
they do not explain. What Cartwright has in mind, of course, is what she calls
fundamental or abstract laws as well as the covering-law model of explanation. If laws
explain by ‘covering’ the facts to be explained, then Cartwright says, the explanation
offered will be false. If, she would go on, the laws are amended by using several ceteris
paribus clauses, they become truer but do not ‘cover’ the facts anymore; hence, in
either case, they do not explain the facts. The reason why covering laws do not explain
has mostly to do with the fact that the actual phenomena are too complex to be
covered by simple laws. Recall her example of a charged particle that moves under the
influence of two forces: the force of gravity and Coulomb’s force. Taken in isolation,
none of the two laws (i.e., Newton’s inverse-square law and Coulomb’s law) can
describe the actual motion of the charged particle. From this, Cartwright concludes
that each loses either its truth or its explanatory power. Here is her argument:
The effect that occurs is not an effect dictated by any one of the two laws separately.
In order to be true in the composite case, the law must describe one effect (the effect
that actually happens); but to be explanatory, it must describe another. There is a
trade-off here between truth and explanatory power (1983, 59).
I fail to see how all this follows. For one, it does not follow that there is not
(worse, there cannot be) a complex law that governs the motion of massive and
charged particles. If we keep our eyes not on epistemology (can this law be known or
stated?) but on metaphysics (can there be such a law?), then the above argument is, to
say the least, inconclusive. For another, in the composite case, there is no formal
tension between truth and explanation. In the composite case, none of the two laws
(Newton’s and Coulomb’s) is strictly true of, in the sense of ‘covering’, the effect that
actually happens. Why should we expect each of them on its own to ‘cover’ the
complex effect? After all, the complex phenomenon is governed by both of them
jointly, and hence it cannot be covered by each of them separately. This does not
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imply that laws lose their explanatory power. They still explain how the particle
would behave if it was just massive and not charged or if it was charged but not
massive. And they still contribute to the full explanation of the complex effect (that is,
of the motion of the charged and massive particle). To demand of each of them to be
explanatory in the sense that each of them should somehow cover the actual complex
effect is to demand of them something they cannot do. The laws do not thereby cease
to be true, nor explanatory. Nor does it follow that they don’t jointly govern the
complex effect. Governing should not be conflated with covering.5
My argument so far might be inconclusive. So, I want to suggest that there is an
important independent reason why we should take laws seriously. Laws individuate
properties: properties are what they are because of the laws they participate in.
Cartwright says: “What I invoke in completing such an explanation are not
fundamental laws of nature, but rather properties of electrons and positrons, and
highly complex, highly specific claims about just what behaviour they lead to in just
this situation” (1983, 92). If it is the case that no laws, no properties, or if properties
and laws are so intertwined that one cannot specify the former without the latter and
conversely, then some laws had better be true. For if they are not, then we cannot talk
of properties either.6
This last point, however, is controversial, especially as of late. It relies on a
Humean understanding of properties. And Cartwright is a non-Humean, more or less
about everything. This observation is crucial. For it is Humeanism that is the real
opponent of Cartwright’s. Her capacities are non-Humean tendencies: causal powers.
That is, they are irreducible, primary and causally active constituents of the world.
Similarly, her properties are non-Humean properties: they are active causal agents,
which are identified via their causal role and their powers. So, it is not laws that
determine what they are; rather, it is properties (capacities etc.) that determine what,
if any, laws hold in the world. With all this in mind, let us turn our attention to her
                                               
5 Spurrett (2001) defends a similar point in much more detail.
6 A huge issue here concerns the nature of laws. I favour the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis approach, which I
defend in some detail in my (2002a, 148-54 & 210-1). This approach can identify laws independently
of their ability to support counterfactuals. However, it seems to require some prior notion of ‘natural
property’. But this notion need not equate properties with causal powers or capacities.
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views about capacities. This is just one of her non-Humean themes. But it is perhaps
the most central one.
5. Capacities
Cartwright has devoted two books in the defence of the claim that capacities are prior
to laws (1989; 1999). As is well known, she challenges the Humean view that laws are
exceptionless regularities, since, she says, there are no such things.7 How then does it
appear that there are regularities in nature, e.g., that all planets move in ellipses?
5.1 Nomological Machines. Cartwright does not deny that there can be regular
behaviour in nature. But she claims that where there is regular behaviour in nature,
there is a nomological machine that makes it possible. A “nomological machine” is
a fixed (enough) arrangement of components, or factors, with stable (enough)
capacities that in the right sort of stable (enough) environment will, with repeated
operation, give rise to the kind of regular behaviour that we represent in our scientific
laws (1999, 50).
Nomological machines make sure that ‘all other things are equal’. So, they secure
the absence of factors, which, were they present, they would block the manifestation
of a regularity. Take Kepler’s law that all planets move in ellipses. This is not a
strictly universal and unconditional law. Planets do (approximately) describe ellipses,
if we neglect the gravitational pull that is exerted upon them by the other planets, as
well as by other bodies in the universe. So, the proper formulation of the law,
Cartwright argues, is: ceteris paribus, all planets move in ellipses. Now, suppose that
the planetary system is a stable enough nomological machine. Suppose, in particular,
that as a matter of fact, the planetary system is (for all practical purposes) shielded: it
is sufficiently isolated from other bodies in the universe, and the pull that the planets
exert on each other is negligible. Under these circumstances, we can leave behind the
                                               
7 For an important survey of the debate around ceteris paribus laws, as well as a defence of strict laws
in physics, see Earman & Roberts (1999). The interested reader should also see the special issue of
Erkenntnis (2002, Vol. 57, no 3) on the status of ceteris paribus laws.
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ceteris paribus clause, and simply say that all planets move in ellipses. But the
regularity holds only so long as the nomological machine backs it up. If the
nomological machine were to fail, so would the regularity. As Cartwright (1999, 49-
50) has put it:
(L)aws of nature (in this necessary regular association sense of ‘law’) hold only ceteris
paribus—they hold only relative to the successful repeated operation of a nomological
machine.
Nomological machines might occur naturally in nature. The planetary system is
such a natural nomological machine. But, according to Cartwright, this is exceptional.
As she says: “more often [the nomological machines] are engineered by us, as in a
laboratory experiment” (1999, 49). “In any case”, she adds, “it takes what I call a
nomological machine to get a law of nature” (ibid.).
For the operation of a nomological machine, it is not enough to have a stable (and
shielded) arrangement of components in place. It is not enough, for instance, to have
the sun, the planets and the gravitational force in place in order for the planetary
machine to run. Cartwright insists that it is the capacities that the components of the
machine have that generate regular behaviour. For instance, “a force has the capacity
to change the state of motion of a massive body” (1999, 51). Couldn’t the nomological
machine itself be taken to be a regularity? No, she answers: “the point is that the
fundamental facts about nature that ensure that regularities can obtain are not again
themselves regularities. They are facts about what things can do” (1995, 4). But what
exactly are capacities, i.e., the things that things can do?
In her (1989, 9) Cartwright focused her attention on “what capacities do and why
we need them” and not on “what capacities are”. What they are is the job of her The
Dappled World. Before, however, we examine what they are, let us see the main
argument she offers as to why we need capacities.
5.2 Why Do We Need Capacities?
5.2.1 The Sellarsian Argument. Sellars (1963) master argument for commitment to
the unobservable entities posited by scientific theories is that they play an
ineliminable explanatory role. In order to formulate it, he had to resist what he aptly
18
called the picture of the levels. According to this picture, the realm of facts is layered.
There is the bottom level of observable entities. Then, there is an intermediate
(observational) level of empirical generalisations about observable entities. And
finally, there is yet another (higher-theoretical) level: unobservable entities and laws
about them. It is part of this picture that while the observational framework is
explanatory of observable entities, the theoretical framework enters the picture by
explaining the inductively established generalisations of the observational framework.
But then, Sellars says, an empiricist can protest that the higher level is dispensable.
He may argue that all the explanatory work vis-à-vis the bottom level is done by the
observational framework and its inductive generalisations. Why then, he may wonder,
posit a higher level in the first place?
Sellars’s diagnosis is that this picture rests on a myth. His argument against the
myth of the levels is that the unobservables posited by a theory explain directly why
(the individual) observable entities behave the way they do and obey the empirical
laws they do (to the extent that they do obey such laws). So, he resists the idea that
the theoretical framework has as its prime function to explain the empirical
generalisations of the observational framework. Sellars claimed that unobservable
entities are indispensable because they also explain why observational generalisations
are, occasionally, violated; why, that is, some observable entities do not behave they
way they should, had their behaviour been governed by the observational
generalisation.
This is a fine argument and I endorse it fully (cf. my 2003a). Cartwright offers an
argument structurally similar to Sellars’s in defence of capacities (cf. 1989, 163). She
has in mind another possible layer-cake. The bottom-level is the non-modal level of
occurrent regularities; the intermediate level is the level of Humean laws (either
deterministic or statistical). The higher level is supposed to be a sui generis causal
one. This layer-cake, Cartwright notes, also invites the thought (or the temptation) to
do away with the higher-level altogether. All the explanatory work, it might be said, is
done by Humean laws, endowed with modal force. The higher (causal) level could then
be just seen as a higher modal level, with no claim to independent existence: it is just a
way to talk about the intermediate level, and in particular a way to set constraints on
laws in order to ensure that they have the required modal force. It is this layer-cake
that Cartwright wants to resist. For her, the higher causal level is indispensable for the
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explanation of what regularities there are (if any) in the world. So, we seem to have a
solid Sellarsian argument for capacities. But do we?
5.2.2 Capacities and Regularities. Before we proceed to examine this, an exegetical
point is in order. Cartwright splits the higher (causal) level into two sub-levels: a
lower sub-level of causal laws and a higher sub-level of ascriptions of capacity. She
couches all this in terms of two levels of generality or more accurately of two levels of
modality (1989, 142). She says:
(…) the concept of general sui generis causal truths—general causal truths not
reducible to associations—separates naturally into two distinct concepts, one at a far
higher level of generality than the other: at the lower level we have the concept of a
causal law; at the higher, the concept of capacity. I speak of two levels of generality,
but it would be more accurate to speak of levels of modality, and for all the
conventional reasons: the claims at both levels are supposed to be universal in space
and through time, they support counterfactuals, license inferences, and so forth (1989,
142).
Why do we need two causal levels? Why, in particular, do we need a level of
capacities? To cut a long story short, Cartwright thinks that causal laws are kinds of
causal generalisations relative to a particular population (cf. 1989, 144). They are
causal, as opposed to Humean laws of association, mostly because, as Cartwright
argues, the facts they report (e.g., that aspirins relieve headaches or that smoking
causes cancer) cannot be fully captured by probabilistic relations among magnitudes or
properties. Causal information is also required to specify the conditions under which
they hold. A further thought then is that ascription of capacities is also necessary in
order to remove the relativised-to-a-population character of causal laws. We don’t just
say that smoking causes cancer to population X. We also want to say that smoking
causes cancer, simpliciter. This claim (which is universal in character) is best seen as a
claim about capacities: C causes E, means C carries the capacity Q to produce E (cf.
1989, 145). Capacities, then, are introduced to explain causal laws and to render them
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universal in character.8 This last point is crucial: causal laws are ceteris paribus. After
all, it’s not invariably the case that aspirin relieves headache. But capacities remove
the ceteris paribus clause: aspirin always carries the capacity to relieve headache.
Capacities, we are told, are stable. If something has the capacity Q, then it carries it
with it from one situation to another (cf. 1989, 145).
What then of Cartwright’s Sellarsian argument for capacities? I will focus on just
one central problem. Sellars saves the higher level of electrons, protons etc. by
focusing on the indispensable role this level plays in the explanation of singular
observable phenomena or things. Similarly, one would demand of Cartwright’s
argument to show how capacities are indispensable for the explanation of occurrent
regularities, without the intervening framework of Humean laws plus modal force. But
it seems that there is a tension in her argument. Whereas in Sellars’s case, the entities
of the theoretical framework (unobservables) can be identified independently of the
entities in the bottom framework, it is debateable that this can happen in Cartwright’s
case. Here there are conflicting intuitions. One is that we need regularities (or Humean
laws) to identify what capacities things carry. Another (Cartwright’s, I think) is that
this is not the case. I am not entirely certain whose intuitions are right. But it seems to
me that the Humean is on a better footing. Capacities might well be posited, but only
after there has been a regular association between relevant event-types. No-one would
mind ascribing to aspirin the capacity to relieve headaches, if that was the product (as
indeed it is) of a regular association between taking aspirins and headaches’ going
away. ‘Regular’ here does not necessarily mean exceptionless. But, so much the better
for positing capacities if the association happens to be exceptionless. To say the least,
one could more easily explain how capacities have modal force. So, there is an
important disanalogy between Sellars’s argument for unobservables and Cartwright’s
argument for capacities, which casts doubt on the indispensability of positing
capacities. That is, in Cartwright's case, we need the lower level (regularities) to
identify the entities of the higher level (capacities).
5.2.3 Single Cases. Cartwright insists that capacities might reveal themselves only
occasionally or only in a single case. Consider what she says:
                                                
8 This point is also made vividly in Cartwright’s (2002).
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‘Aspirins relieve headaches’. This does not say that aspirins always relieve headaches,
or always do so if the rest of the world is arranged in a particularly felicitous way, or
that they relieve headaches most of the time, or more often than not. Rather it says
that aspirins have the capacity to relieve headaches, a relatively enduring and stable
capacity that they carry with them from situation to situation; a capacity which may
if circumstances are right reveal itself by producing a regularity, but which is just as
surely seen in one good single case. The best sign that aspirins can relieve headaches is
that on occasion some of them do (1989, 3—emphasis added).
This is surely puzzling. Just adding the adjective ‘good’ before the ‘single case’ does
not help much. A ‘good’ controlled experiment might persuade the scientist that he
has probably identified some causal agent. But surely, commitment to it follows only
if the causal agent has a regular behaviour which can be probed in similar experiments.
A single finding is no more compelling than a single sighting of a UFO. Single or
occasional manifestations cast doubt on the claim that there is a stable and enduring
capacity at play (cf. also Glennan 1997, 607-8).
Cartwright disagrees. In her (1999, 83), she advances what she calls the “analytic
method” in virtue of which capacity ascriptions are established. In her (2002, 435-6)
she summarises her ideas thus:
We commonly use the analytic method in science. We perform an experiment in ‘ideal’
conditions, I, to uncover the ‘natural’ effect E of some quantity, Q. We then suppose
that Q will in some sense ‘tend’ or ‘try’ to produce the same effect in other very
different kinds of circumstances. (...) This procedure is not justified by the regularity
law we establish in the experiment, namely ‘In I, Q  -->E’; rather, to adopt the
procedure is to commit oneself to the claim ‘Q has the capacity to E”.
What is the force of this claim? Note, first, that we don’t have a clear idea of what
it means to say that Q ‘tends’ or ‘tries’ to produce its effects. It seems that either Q
does produce its effect or it doesn’t (if, say, other factors intervene). Second, as Teller
(2002, 718) notes, it is not clear how the ‘trying’ can be established by looking at a
single case only. One thought here might be that if we have seen Q producing its effect
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at least one time, then we can assume that it can produce it; and hence that it has the
capacity to produce it. But I don’t think this is the right way to view things. Consider
the following three questions: (i) what exactly is Q’s effect? (ii) how can we know
that it was Q which brought E about? and (iii) wouldn’t it be rather trivial to say that
for each effect there is some capacity X which produces it? All three questions would
be (more easily) answered if we took capacities to be regularly manifested. The
‘regularity law’ ‘In I, Q -->E’ makes the positing of a capacity legitimate. It is because
(and insofar as) ‘In I, Q -->E’ holds that we can say that ‘Q has the capacity to E’,
and not the other way around.9
If the capacity Q of x to bring about y was manifested regularly, then one could say
that the presence of the capacity could be tested. Hence, one could move on to
legitimately attribute this capacity to x. But if a capacity can manifest itself in a single
case, then it is not clear at all how the presence of the capacity can be tested. Why, in
other words, should we attribute to x the capacity to bring about y, instead of claming
that the occurrence of y was a matter of chance? So, there seems to be a tension
between Cartwright’s claim that capacities are manifestable even in single cases and
her further claim that capacities are testable.10
                                                
9 Cartwright (2002, 436) argues that capacities help explain what makes the design of a single
experiment ‘a good one’: the design is good if it controls for all factors relevant to the effect. But why
do we need an appeal to capacities to do this? In a clinical trial what Cartwright demands can be
achieved by randomisation. In a physical experiment, in order to control for all factors relevant to the
effect we need to appeal to regularities in the following sense: we need to control for all factors that
regularly influence effects of this type. Strictly speaking, we cannot control for factors that do not fall
under a regularity, since we don’t have a clue as to what they might be. When, in an experiment, one
does not control for the colour of the experimenter’s eyes, it is because there is no regularity that
connects the colour of eyes with the result of the experiment. Little (if anything) is gained if we add
that the colour of the eyes do not have the capacity to alter the effect.
10 One might argue that there are clear cases in which a single case is enough to posit a capacity. An
example put to me by Christoph Schmidt-Petri is the capacity to run fast: one case is supposed to
prove its existence. I am not so sure this is true. What if I run fast (just once) because I took a certain
steroid on a given occasion? Surely, in this case I don't have the capacity to run fast, though the
steroid might have the (stable) capacity to make people run fast. But this latter capacity would need
regular manifestation in order to be posited. For more criticism of Cartwright’s argument that
capacities are necessary in the methodology of science, see Giere (forthcoming).
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So far, I have focused on the relation between capacities (the higher level) and
regularities (the lower level). But there is also a problem concerning the two sub-levels
of the higher level, viz., capacities and causal laws.11 Do claims about the presence of
capacities have extra content over the claims made by ordinary causal laws? So, do we
really need to posit capacities? Take, for instance, the ordinary causal law that aspirin
relieves headaches. If we ascribed to aspirin a capacity to relieve headaches, would we
gain in content? There is a sense in which we would. Ordinary causal laws are ceteris
paribus, whereas capacity claims are not. Since it is only under certain circumstances
that aspirin relieves headaches, it is only ceteris paribus true that aspirin causes
headache relief. But, Cartwright might say, once it is established that aspirin carries
the capacity to relieve headaches, the ceteris paribus clause is removed: the capacity is
always there, even if there may be contravening factors that block, on occasion, its
manifestation. The problem with this attempt to introduce capacities is that the
strictly universal character of claims about capacities cannot be established. If it is
allowed that claims about the presence of capacities might be based on single
manifestations, then it is not quite clear what kind of inference is involved in the
movement from a single manifestation to the presence of the capacity. Surely, it
cannot be an inference based on any kind of ordinary inductive argument.12 If, on the
other hand, it is said that claims about capacities are established by ordinary inductive
methods, based on several manifestations of the relevant capacity, then all that can be
established is a ceteris paribus law. Based on cases of uses of aspirin, all that it can be
established is that ceteris paribus, aspirin relieves headaches. So, it is questionable
that talk about capacities has extra content over talk about ordinary causal laws.
Cartwright could argue that claims about capacities are strictly universal in the
sense that objects have capacities even if they completely fail to manifest them (cf.
her 2002, 427-8). However, she would then seem to compromise her view that
capacities are measurable and testable. There is a deep, if common, reason why we
                                                
11 A variant of this problem has been posed by Morrison (1995)
12 This point calls into question Cartwright’s claim that capacities show how we can make sense of
inductions from single experiments (1999, 90; 2002, 436). Undoubtedly, if stable capacities are in
operation, then knowing them is enough to generalise from a single experiment. But how is the
antecedent of the conditional grounded? It seems that we need regular behaviour (and hence plenty of
inductive evidence) in order to posit stable capacities in the first place.
24
should be wary of unmanifestable capacities: there could be just too many of them,
even contradictory ones. Couldn’t we just say of any false generalisation (e.g., that
bodies rise if they are left unsupported) that the bodies involved in it have the relevant
capacity, though it is never manifested? And couldn’t we say that an object carries at
the same time the stable capacity to rise if left unsupported and the stable capacity to
fall if left unsupported, but that the former is unmanifestable? In other words, what
distinguishes between unmanifestable capacities and non-existent ones? Moral:
if Cartwright insists on single manifestation of capacities, she faces a sticky trilemma.
Either talk of capacities does not have extra content over talk in terms of ordinary
causal laws; or there is a mysterious method that takes us from a single manifestation
to the capacity; or there are unmanifestable capacities. All three options have
unpalatable consequences.
5.2.4 Capacities and Interactions. To be fair to Cartwright, she has offered other
reasons for commitment to capacities. One of them is that capacities can explain
causal interaction. She says:
causal interactions are interactions of causal capacities, and they cannot be picked out
unless capacities themselves are recognised (1989, 164).
There are cases that fit this model. A venomous snake bites me and I take an
antidote. The venom in my bloodstream has the capacity to kill me but I don’t die
because the antidote has the capacity to neutralise the venom. That’s a case of causal
interaction, where one capacity blocks another. I am not sure this commits us to sui
generis capacities, as opposed to whatever chemical properties the venom and the
antidote have and a law which connects these properties. But let’s not worry about
this. For, there is a more pressing problem.
Suppose that I take an aspirin while I am still hearing the continuous and desperate
screaming of my daughter who suffers from colic. The aspirin has the capacity to
relieve my headache, but the headache does not go away. It persists undiminished.
How shall I explain this? Shall I say that this is because the screaming of my daughter
has the capacity to cause aspirin-resistant headaches? This would be overly ad hoc.
Shall I say that this is because the screaming of my daughter has the capacity to
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neutralise the capacity of aspirin to relieve headache? This would be very mysterious.
Something has indeed happened: there has been an interaction of some sort which
made aspirin not work. But why should I attribute this to a capacity of the screaming?
If I did that, I would have to attribute to the screaming a number of capacities: the
capacity to-let-aspirin-work-if-it-is-mild, the capacity to let-aspirin-work-if-it-is-not-
mild-but-I-go-away-and-let-my-wife-deal-with-my-daughter, the capacity to block-
aspirins’-work-if-it-is-extreme etc. This is not exactly an argument against the role of
capacities in causal interaction (though it might show that there can be causal
interaction without reference to capacities). Still, it seems a genuine worry: when
trying to account for causal interaction, where do we stop positing capacities and
what kinds of them should we posit?
Cartwright challenges the sceptic about capacities with the following: “the attempt
to ‘modalise away’ the capacities requires some independent characterisation of
interactions; and there is no general non-circular account available to do the job” (1989,
164). If we could not characterise interactions without reference to capacities, we had
better accept them. But why not one follow, for instance, Salmon (1997) or Dowe
(2000) in their thought that interactions are explained in terms of exchanges of
conserved quantities? There is no compelling reason to take them to be capacities. We
could; (Cartwright, for instance, takes charge to be a capacity). But then again we
couldn’t. Charge might well be a property (an occurrent property, that is) in virtue of
which, and given certain laws, a particle that instantiates it behaves the ways it does.
5.3 What Are Capacities? Suppose that we do need to posit capacities. What exactly
is the thing we need to posit? Cartwright is certainly in need of a more detailed
account of how capacities are individuated. In her (1989, 141) we are told that
capacities are of properties and not of individuals: “the property of being an aspirin
carries with it the capacity to cure headaches”. But aspirin is not, strictly speaking, a
property. It’s something that has a property. And certainly it does not carry its
capacity to relieve headaches in the same way in which it carries its shape or colour.
It would be more accurate to say that capacities are properties of properties. That is,
that they are second-order properties. But this would create some interesting
problems. It would open the way for someone to argue that capacities are functional
(or causal) roles. This would imply that there must be occupants of these causal roles,
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which are not themselves capacities. They could be the properties (may be many and
variable) that occupy this causal role. So, the capacity to relieve pain would be a
causal role filled (or realised) by different properties (e.g., the chemical structure of
paracetamol or whatever else). If, however, we take capacities to be causal roles, it
would be open for someone to argue, along the lines of Prior, Pargeter and Jackson
(1982) that capacities are causally impotent. The argument is simple. Capacities are
distinct from their causal bases (since they are properties of them). They must have a
causal basis (a realiser), since they are second-order. This causal basis (some
properties) are themselves a sufficient set of properties for the causal explanation of
the manifestation of the capacity (whenever it is manifested). Hence, the capacity qua
distinct (second-order) property is causally impotent.
Cartwright wouldn’t be willing to accept this conclusion. But then capacities must
be of properties (or be carried by properties) in a different way. What exactly this
way is it is not clear. She asks: “Does this mean that there are not one but two
properties, with the capacity sitting on the shoulder of the property which carries it?”
And she answers: “Surely not” (1989, 9). But no clear picture emerges as to what this
relation of ‘a carrying b’ is. (And is this ‘carrying’ another capacity, as in a has the
capacity to carry b? And if so, isn’t there a regress in the offing?) At a different place,
we are told that capacities have powers, which they can retain or lose (in causal
interactions) (cf. 1989, 163). Is that then a third-order property? A property (power)
of a property (capacity) of a property (aspirin)? I don’t think Cartwright wants to
argue this. But what does she want to argue?
In her (1999) she comes back to these issues. Here it seems that another possibility
is canvassed, viz., that properties themselves are capacities. It’s not clear whether she
takes all properties to be capacities, but it seems that she takes at least some to be.
We are given examples such as force and charge. I am not sure I have this right, but it
seems to follow from expressions such as: “Coulomb’s law describes a capacity that a
body has qua charged” (1999, 53). It also seems to follow from considering concepts
such as “attraction, repulsion, resistance, pressure, stress, and so on” as concepts
referring to capacities (1999, 66). In any case, it seems that she aligns herself with
Shoemaker’s view of properties as “conglomerates of powers” (1999, 70). Capacities
then seem to come more or less for free: “any world with the same properties as ours
would ipso facto have capacities in it, since what a property empowers an object to do
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is part of what it is to be that property” (1999, 70). So, it seems that Cartwright
adopts a causal theory of properties, where properties themselves are causal powers.
5.4 Capacities and Laws. A number of questions crop up at this point. First, are all
powers with which a property empowers an object constitutive of this property?
And if not, how are we to draw a distinction between constitutive powers and non-
constitutive ones? For instance, is the causal power of aspirin to relieve headache on a
par with its causal power to be white? This is not a rhetorical question. For it seems
that in order to distinguish these two powers in terms of their causal relevance to
something being an aspirin, we need to differentiate between those powers that are
causally relevant to a certain effect e.g., relieving pain, and those powers that are
causally relevant to another, e.g., producing a pleasing white image. Then, we seem to
run in the following circle. We need to specify what powers are causally relevant to
something being P. For this, we need to distinguish the effects which are brought
about by P in two sorts: those that are the products of causally relevant powers and
those that are not. But in order to do this we need first to specify what it is for
something being P.13 That is, we need to specify what powers are causally relevant
to P’s identity and what are not. Ergo, we come back to where we started. (Recall that
on the account presently discussed causal powers are the only vehicle to specify P’s
identity).
Second question: why is it the case that some causal powers are held together and
others are not? Why, that is, certain powers have a certain kind of “causal unity”, as
Shoemaker (1980, 125) put it? This is a crucial question because even if every
property is a cluster of powers, the converse does not hold. Electrons come with the
power to attract positively charged particles and the power to resist acceleration, but
they don’t come with the power to be circular. And the power of a knife to cut wood
does not come with the power to be made of paper. This is important because, as
Shoemaker himself observes (cf. ibid.), the concurrence of certain powers might well
be the consequence of a law. So, it might well be that laws hold some capacities
together. Hence, it seems that we cannot just do with capacities. We also need laws as
                                                
13 Compare: something could be an aspirin without having the causal power to produce a white
image; but something could not be an aspirin without having the power to relieve headaches.
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our building blocks. This issue has a ramification. Why is it the case that nothing has
the power to move faster than light? The absence of a certain capacity might also be
the consequence of a natural law.
Third question: Should we be egalitarian about capacities? Is the capacity to resist
acceleration on a par with the capacity to become grandparent? Or with the capacity
to be a table-owned-by-George-Washington? This question is different from the first
above. It relates to what in the literature is called the difference between genuine
changes and mere Cambridge changes. The parallel here would be a difference between
genuine capacities (properties) and mere-Cambridge capacities (properties). Here
again, laws are in the offing. For it can be argued that genuine capacities (properties)
are those who feature in laws of nature.
I offer these questions as challenges. But they do seem to point to a certain double
conclusion. On the one hand, we need to be told more about what capacities are before
we start thinking seriously that we should be committed to them. On the other hand,
we seem to require laws as well as capacities, even if we accept capacities as building
blocks.
In her (1999), Cartwright wants to advance further the view that capacities are
metaphysically prior to laws. She says: “It is capacities that are basic, and laws of
nature obtain—to the extent that they do obtain—on account of the capacities” (1999,
49). She offers no formal treatment of the issue how capacities relate to laws. Instead,
we are given some examples.
I say that Newton’s and Coulomb’s principles describe the capacities to be moved
and to produce a motion that a charged particle has, in the first case the capacity it has
on account of its gravitational mass and in the second, on account of its charge (1999,
65).
If laws describe what the entities involved in them can do on account of their
capacities, then these capacities should be individuated, and ascribed, to entities,
independently of the lawlike behaviour of the latter. But, as noted above, it is not clear
that this can be done. It seems that far from being independent of laws, the property
of, say, charge is posited and individuated by reference to the lawlike behaviour of
certain types of objects: some attract each other, while others repel each other in a
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regular fashion. The former are said to have opposite charges, while the latter have
similar charge. Cartwright (1999, 54-5) says:
The capacity is associated with a single feature—charge—which can be ascribed to a
body for a variety of reasons independent of its display of the capacity described in
the related law.
This may well be true. But it does not follow that the capacity is grounded in no
laws at all. Cartwright disagrees. She (1999, 72) claims that
[c]apacity claims, about charge, say, are made true by facts about what it is in the
nature of an object to do by virtue of being charged.
Then, one would expect an informative account of what it is in the nature of an
object to do. Specifically, one would expect that the nature of an object would
determine its capacities, and would delineate what this object can and cannot do. But
she (1999, 73) goes on to say:
There is no fact of the matter about what a system can do just by virtue of having a
given capacity, What it does depends on its setting...
Why, then, should we bother to attribute capacities? We could just offer an open-
ended list of the things that a system does when it is placed in several settings. If, at
least, there was a fact of the matter as to what a system can do by virtue of having a
given capacity, the capacity could be used a) to predict what a system can or cannot
do; and b) to explain why it behaves the way it does. In fact, if Cartwright really
means to uphold the strong view that there is no fact of the matter as to what a
system can do by having a certain capacity, then the very possibility of prediction
and of explanation is threatened. For any kind of behaviour would be compatible with
the system’s having a certain capacity. No specific behaviour could be predicted and
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any kind of behaviour could be explained (by an appeal to context-specific
impediments of the system’s capacities).14
One might object, however, that Cartwright’s wording is very careful. It does not
imply that there is no fact of the matter about what a system (or an object) can do by
virtue of its nature. Yet, one would expect that if the nature of an object placed some
substantive constraints on its capacities, there would be a fact of the matter about
what this object can do by virtue of its capacities. For instance, one would expect that
although a certain particle has the capacity to move, its nature constrains this capacity
so that it cannot move with velocity greater than the velocity of light. As this example
suggests, it might well be the case that the nature of an object is constrained by what
laws it obeys.
In a previous draft of this paper, I tried to examine in some detail what these
natures are and how they might relate to capacities. But Paul Teller directed my
attention to the following passage, in which Cartwright says:
My use of the terms capacity and nature are closely related. When we ascribe to a
feature (like charge) a generic capacity (like the Coulomb capacity) by mentioning
some canonical behaviour that systems with this capacity would display in ideal
circumstances, then I say that that behaviour is in the nature of that feature. Most of
my arguments about capacities could have been put in terms of natures ... (1999, 84-
5).
So, it seems clear that Cartwright thinks there is no significant distinction between
capacity and nature. But suppose that she followed many other friends of capacities
and distinguished between capacities and natures. Fisk (1970) and Harré (1970),
among others, think that an appeal to an entity’s nature can explain why this entity
has certain capacities. In particular, Harré (1970) argues that a) discovering the nature
of an entity is a matter of empirical investigation; but b) specifying (or knowing) the
exact nature of an entity is not necessary for grounding the ascription of a power to it.
He links natures and capacities thus:
                                                
14 A similar complaint is voiced by Earman and Roberts (1999, 456) and by Teller (2002, 719).
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There is a j such that something has j, and whatever had j in C, would have to G,
i.e., if something like a did not have j in C it would not, indeed could not G (1970,
101).
The nature j of an entity is thereby linked with its capacity to G. There are many
problems with this proposal.15 But I will focus on one. What is it that makes the
foregoing counterfactual true? It’s not enough to have the circumstances C and the
nature j in order to get G. This is not just because G could be unmanifested. Even if
we thought that the power to G were always manifested in circumstances C with a
characteristic effect e, there would still be room for asking the question: what makes it
the case that a’s being j in C makes it produce the characteristic effect e? We need,
that is, something to relate (or connect) all these together and the answer that springs
to mind is that it is a law that does the trick.16 This law might well be a brute
(Humean) regularity.17
An advocate of natures could say that when the nature j is present, there in no
need to posit a law in order to explain why a certain object has a characteristic effect e
when the circumstances are C. Yet this move would not really be explanatory. It
would amount to taking natures to be collections of powers and this hardly explains in
an interesting way why a certain nature has the capacities it does: it just equates the
nature of an object with a collection of its capacities.
6. A Concluding Remark
As we have seen, Cartwright has moved from a modest realist position (viz., realism
about entities) to a super-realist position (viz., realism about powers and capacities).
                                               
15 See the criticisms of Fisk’s views by Aune (1970) and McMullin (1970)
16 A similar point is made by Menzies (2002). Teller (2002, 720-1) also notes that capacities might
well be no different from the OK properties that Cartwright argues should figure in laws.
17 This is just one option, of course. As Teller has stressed to me (see also his 2002, 722), another
option would be to look for a mechanism that connects the nature f  with its power to produce a
characteristic effect in certain circumstances. I have a number of objections to mechanisms that I cannot
repeat here (see my 2003b). At any rate, it seems enough for the purposes of this paper that it remains
an open option that Humean regularities may get the capacities do whatever they do.
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Part of her motivation for her early, restricted, realism was a certain anti-
fundamentalism, viz., a resistance to the view that there are fundamental laws of
nature, which determine what entities do, and which are captured (or should be
captured) by scientific theories. It may be a bit ironic that she now replaces this
picture by another fundamentalism, viz., the view that capacities are the fundamental
building blocks of the world, the things that make things to be what they are and to
behave the way they do. Along the way, her early anti-theory temper was softened.
But her early anti-laws temper was hardened.
In contemplating about Cartwright’s realist toil, we have learned a lot. But it seems
that we are still short of a compelling reason to take capacities seriously as
fundamental non-Humean constituents of the world. At any rate, even if we granted
capacities, we would still need laws to i) identify them; ii) connect them with their
manifestations; iii) explain their stability; iv) explain why some (but not others) occur
together; v) explain why some (but not others) obstruct the manifestation of others. It
seems then that both the epistemology and the metaphysics of capacities require laws.
Nancy Cartwright is to be commended for trying to make a case for the view that
capacities are enough for laws. If the argument in the later part of the this paper has
been correct, then the situation is more complicated: laws and capacities are necessary
for laws.
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